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THE POTENTIAL ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
SARAH MONTGOMERY *
Economists have always equivocated in their evaluation of the
potential economic effects of the establishment of the European.
Economic Community (EEC). Beginning in 1950 with simultaneous
writings on the subject by Maurice Bye, Herbert Gierch,• and Jacob
Viner,1
 a body of literature has developed which recognizes that from
a world viewpoint as well as from the outlook of the participants, an
economic union has potential both for adding to and for lessening
economic welfare.
The basic fact about the structure of economic unions that leads
to this ambivalence is that tariffs are removed between member
countries but are retained between the union and the rest of the world.
The result is that while discrimination is eliminated between domestic
producers and producers in the other countries in the union, discrimina-
tion is created between producers in the member countries and pro-
ducers outside the union. Production is allocated optimally throughout
the world if goods are produced by the lowest cost suppliers. 2 If the
lowest cost suppliers are within the economic union, then the formation
of the union is advantageous, since these lowest cost suppliers now can
sell in other member countries, displacing any producers there who
were previously maintained by tariff protection. 3 If, however, the lowest
cost producers are outside the union, but were able to sell to some of
its members over their tariff barriers before the union was organized,
after the formation of the union these lowest cost producers may find
themselves displaced by producers within the union whose costs are
less than theirs plus the tariff.
Any comparison of costs must allow for decreases in production
costs within the union due to its formation. One of the most widely
mentioned potential values of an economic community is that it extends
the site of the market, and, by so doing, allows for realization of
economies of scale. Since the producers in each of the member countries
face no higher duties outside the union 4 and lower duties within it,
the potential market for their output is larger. This will allow the more
* A.B. 1951, Vassar College; M.A. 1952, Columbia University; Ph.D. 1960, Uni-
versity of Wisconsin. Currently, Assistant Professor of Economics and Sociology, Mt.
Holyoke College. Recipient, Brookings Research Professorship, 1965-66.
I For a brief description of the contribution of each and full bibliographical refer-
ences, see Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration 22 (1961).
2 Because then it is impossible to shift output among producers without increasing
total production costs.
3 For an elaboration of the various possibilities see Balassa, supra note 1, at 25-26.
4 This assumes that there is no retaliatory action by those outside the community.
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efficient and better financed firms to expand. If they have not already
fully realized any economies of scale, their costs will fall. Therefore,
the formation of a union can lead to the replacement of an outside
producer by a member producer that has become the lowest cost
supplier.
in considering whether the formation of the European Economic
Community has greater potential for moving trade away from or
towards the lowest cost producers, it is useful to look first at three
points which have been elaborated by Bela Balassa." The first is the
economic size of the union; the second, the transportation costs
within the area as compared with those between it and the rest of the
world; the third, the original competitive or complementary nature
of the economies within the union.
It can be argued that the larger its economic size, the more
likely an economic union will promote economic welfare, since
the larger the proportion of world production within the union, the
greater the likelihood that it will contain the lowest cost producer.
An economic union will also tend to be advantageous if transporta-
tion costs are low among its members compared to their level in the
area's trade with the rest of the world. If this is the case, then the
chances are greater that after taking account of transportation costs,
the lowest cost supplier is within the union. Pre-union competitive-
ness of the exports of the several members is also likely to lead to
gains because this indicates similarities in composition of output of
the several countries and, therefore, greater possibilities that lower
cost producers in one country will displace higher cost producers in
other Member States.
In terms of each of these three considerations, the European
Economic Community would seem to score quite high. First, it is
economically large. Its gross national product (GNP) in 1962 was 227
billion dollars.' Second, except for Italy its six members are separ-
ated by minimum transportation costs, although there are also very low
transportation costs between the EEC countries as a group and the
non-Member States of Austria, Switzerland and Great Britain. Third,
the Six were quite competitive before union and so should provide
opportunities for displacement of high cost by low cost producers.?
5
 Balassa, supra note 1, at 29-44.
6 This compares with the United States GNP in 1962 of $556 billion and a GNP
for all the European members of the OECD (which includes the EEC countries) of
$379 billion. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, General Statistics
(Supp., National Accounts) 12, 14, 37 (March 1964).
7
 The former overseas dependencies of the six European countries are also included
in the union, however. Their economies were largely complementary to those of the
Six with their competitors outside the union. The EEC is expected in a number of cases
to discriminate against the lowest cost suppliers in favoring these former dependencies.
Balassa, supra note 1, at 33.
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Two other important considerations are the height of the orig-
inal tariff and the height of the external tariff of the union.' The
higher the original tariffs of the member countries, the greater the
potential gain from their elimination. The higher the ultimate tariff
imposed by the union, the greater the potential loss because of dis-
crimination between producers within and without the Community.
Finally, if the common external tariff is above or below the pre-union
tariffs of the Member States, discrimination will be increased or de-
creased between each country's producers and those outside the
union.°
However, although the great significance of tariff levels is very
apparent, it is extremely difficult to say much about their effect in
any particular case. First, there is a problem of measurement. There
is not one rate of duty but a large number of duties which must be
averaged. Probably the most satisfactory set of weights that could
be used in constructing this average are the quantities which would
be traded in the absence of any tariff barriers. These quantities, how-
ever, are not known. Second, if the averaging problem can be
somehow resolved there is still no absolute standard by which to as-
certain whether the original tariffs and the common external tariff
are high or low.
In the case of the tariff of the European Economic Community
for other than agricultural products, it has been shown that under
a number of different weighting schemes the common external tariff
which will fully come into effect in 196710 does not differ greatly
from the present United States tariff." This common external tariff
is (with some exceptions) the average of the 1957 tariffs of the six
member countries. To reach the common level, the French and
Italian tariffs will generally have to be lowered and the German and
Benelux duties raised. The difficulties of evaluating the height of this
tariff is suggested by an argument which has been put forth by
Lawrence Krause. He maintains that the German producers are gen-
erally those within the Community with the lowest costs, and that
since the German duties will rise, the degree of protection against
outside producers will increase although the common tariff was set
8
 For a discussion of the significance of the height of tariffs, see Balassa, supra note
1, at 44-49.
9
 In the case of a free trade area, such as the European Free Trade Association,
this last is not a consideration, since each country maintains its previous tariff on goods
from outside the area.
19
 The original date for the complete achievement of a common external tariff
was January 1, 1970, but now it is expected that the actual date will be July 1, 1967.
11 See Committee for Economic Development, Trade Negotiations for a Better Free
World Economy 67-85 (App. B) (May 1964). This was prepared by the CED Research
Staff.
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at the pre-union average." Despite the difficulties of precise evalu-
ation of the impact of the non-agricultural tariffs, it has nonethelesg
been quite widely concluded that the common tariff schedule of the
EEC is not particularly high and that there are significant indica-
tions that the Community is •willing to lower it further through trade
negotiations." The Community's policy on agricultural protection is,
however, another matter.
The member countries of the Community, like the United States,
have given special aid to their farmers' to support their prices and
their incomes. Unlike the United States, however, the Community
tends to have high cost producers and to be a net importer of agri-
cultural products. In the Treaty of Rome" the member countries
agreed to set up a special treatment for agricultural products. Under
a subsequent agreement reached in January 1962, it was decided that
the duties levied on agricultural goods from outside the area will be
variable. They will change sufficiently so that products from outside
will cost, inclusive of duty, as much as the support price set for
Community farm products plus a small premium." This will guar-
antee that all of the demand for agricultural products at the floor
prices which can be supplied by the Community's producers will be
so met. The only market left for producers from outside the area
will be for any excess of Community demand over Community supply
at the floor price. Should, on the other hand, the Community's
farmers supply more than is demanded, the surplus will be sold on
world markets at the world price with an export subsidy paid by
the Community.
The effect of such a policy hinges, of course, on the height of
the floor price. If it is low relative to production costs within the
EEC, Community farmers will supply little and much will have to be
imported to satisfy demand at the support price. On the other hand,
if the price is set high enough, all the demand in the Community will
be met by its own producers and there may even be a surplus to be
sold abroad. In the Common •Market's agricultural support program,
the pivotal price is that for wheat. All other prices will be adjusted
12
 Salant et al., The United States Balance of Payments in 1968 101-102 (1963).
13
 In both 1962 and 1963 the EEC members moved their tariffs towards the
eventual common external tariff as if reductions had been made in this tariff. These EEC
moves are conditional on their being reciprocated. For further discussion of this point
see Committee for Economic Development, supra note 11, at 25-26.
14
 For a useful summary of the provisions of the treaty see Committee for Economic
Development, The European Common Market & Its Meaning to the United States 92-113
(May 1959). This was prepared by the CED Research Staff.
15
 Committee for Economic Development, supra note 11, at 28-29, explains the
variable levy in more detail.
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to it. In December 1964, agreement was reached on a wheat price,
part way between the higher German and the lower French prices.
With the wheat price so set and the other prices established in relation
to it, it is expected that the EEC will greatly reduce its imports of
temperate zone food products and will eventually have considerable
export surpluses in a number of agricultural products."
The potential economic effects of a union like the EEC are,
however, considerably more extensive than has been indicated thus
far. When the markets for many products have been dominated by
a limited number of sellers who have tended to collude, either ex-
plicitly through overt agreements or implicitly by recognizing their
mutual interdependence, one of the more important results of such
a union may be that it increases or decreases the amount of effective
competition among the sellers. There are a number of possibilities.
The elimination of intra-area trade barriers tends to increase the
number of potential competitors and, therefore, to decrease the
likelihood of effective collusion. Any increase in external barriers,
however, has the opposite effect. With a given technology, the
changes in the amount of competition will be associated with changes
in the levels of prices and of output. If collusive patterns weaken,
output will increase and prices will fall. This will result in an im-
provement in economic welfare as resources are drawn away from
industries where they were being used to produce goods with lower
value to the consumer. If competition declines, the allocation of re-
sources will worsen as the monopolistic industries raise prices and
contract output.'
It cannot be assumed, however, that changes in the degree of com-
petition will leave the level of technology unchanged. Again, there is
more than one possibility. Greater competition could retard the rate
of technological change if, as it is sometimes argued, high profits
are necessary to provide firms with funds to finance the research
which leads to technological innovations. On the other hand, in-
16 Balassa, European Integration: Problems and Issues, Am. Econ. Rev., May 1963,
at 181-82.
17 The assumption made here is that where collusive patterns are stronger, prices
and outputs are closer to those which would be chosen by a monopolist. A monopolist,
knowing he will have to charge a lower price in order to sell a large quantity, will
tend to keep his prices higher and output lower than those which would prevail if
competition expanded output and pushed prices down. Because of the restricted output,
the marginal unit produced by the monopolist will sell for a price above the marginal
cost of producing the goods, while the price of goods sold under conditions of perfect
competition will just equal the marginal cost of production. Expansion of output of
monopolistic industries and contraction of the output of the more perfectly competitive
firms, therefore, results in resources being moved into the production of goods where
their value (as measured by the price of the goods they produce) is higher relative
to their cost.
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creased competition may, by cutting profit margins with any given
level of technology, force firms into greater research in search of
lower cost methods. It also may compel firms to introduce new
methods more rapidly than they would if they had greater market
power. The latter may be the most important point. Monopolistic
producers may find it advantageous to collude on the rate of inno-
vation as well as on prices and output. The introduction of a new
method of production or a new product might be postponed because
it would make old machines obsolete. If no one introduces the new
technology until the old machines have fully depreciated, all may
make higher profits. If, however, one firm in a more competitive
market adopts a cost-saving innovation at once, this will force the
rest of the producers to follow suit.
In Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome the member countries
commited themselves (with some reservations) to the elimination of
private barriers to freedom of trade. Although the implementation
of these articles is still largely in the future and, therefore, their
effect is quite uncertain, it is significant that such a policy was a-
greed to by countries that have previously permitted, encouraged, or
required cartelization in a number of industries.' Such a policy of
opposition to private restraints on competition combined with the
lowering of tariff barriers within the market would seem likely to
lead to an increase in competition with resultant gains both from
lower prices and larger outputs of previously cartelized products and
from more rapid rates of innovation.
Finally, we must consider the possibility that the formation of
an economic union affects the rate of utilization of the productive
capacity of the area as distinct from its effects on the size of that
capacity. If without the union the relationship between aggregate
demand and aggregate supply is such that the economies of the mem-
bers tend to operate at less than full capacity, the institution of the
union could improve economic welfare if it leads to increases in de-
mand. This could result from increases in investment due to the ex-
pansion of markets and the acceleration of technological change. If
this should occur, it is possible that the fuller use of capacity could
lead to a net increase in welfare even if there are unfavorable effects
on welfare due to reallocation of production from lower cost to higher
cost producers or because of tighter monopolistic controls over
markets.
It can be argued that there were some signs of a slowing down
18 The fact that this reflects a radical change in policy is discussed in Markham,
Competition in the European Common Market, in Factors Affecting the United States
Balance of Payments 139 (1962), a compilation of studies prepared for the Subcommit-
tee on International Exchange and Payments of the Joint Economic Committee.
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of the growth of economic activity prior to the formation of the
EEC and that the reactions of business to its establishment kept such
a deceleration of growth from occurring.' 9 It is most likely, however,
that if private demand had become inadequate to keep these econ-
omies at full employment their governments would have acted to
maintain aggregate demand. The post-World War II record of these
nations indicates that their governments are both willing and able
to use monetary and fiscal policies to prevent any substantial under-
utilization of capacity. It cannot be concluded, therefore, that the
net effects on aggregate demand of the formation of EEC are of any
great significance.
It is certainly much too soon to draw any very definite conclu-
sions about the ultimate impact of the EEC on the allocation of
world resources and the rate of growth of output. The result depends
in part on the way the anti-cartel policy is implemented. Even more
important is the future course of the negotiations between the EEC
and the rest of the world on the lowering of trade barriers. If the
"Kennedy Round" of negotiations under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which is now under way, should lead to
substantially lower tariffs, the amount of discrimination against out-
siders would be decreased and the chances that gains will outweigh
losses enhanced. But, as United States negotiators have emphasized,
the position of the EEC on agricultural duties will be very central to
the success of present and future GATT deliberations. If the EEC
should persist in maintaining floor prices which will make the area in-
creasingly self-sufficient, then even a very liberal policy on other
products may not be adequate to lead to a net liberalization of the
tariff barriers. What position the EEC will take in the GATT negotia-
tions must depend in part on the positions taken by the United States,
the non-Common Market countries, and the other nations involved,
and also upon a complex series of domestic economic and political con-
siderations within each EEC country. But, finally, it will also be im-
portantly influenced by all of the political relationships among the Six.
It must always be remembered that the EEC was and is an economic
mechanism for achieving a political end.
It should be clear that the results of the GATT negotiations are
very important to the trading partners of the EEC. It should not be
concluded, however, that their successful completion will eliminate
alt of the actual or potential difficulties created for other nations by
the formation of the Community.
From the viewpoint of the United States, a substantial lowering
19 Balassa, supra note 16, at 176-77 considers evidence for and against this con-
clusion. On balance, he tends to accept the proposition.
431
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
of the EEC external tariff would be desirable, because it would make
it easier for the United States to sell in the European market. As a
result, the United States balance of payments would become more
favorable on current account. Lowering EEC tariffs would also lessen
the advantages to United States firms of going into Europe to set up
factories inside its tariff walls. This would mean a smaller outflow of
direct investment, a debit item in the balance of payments. However,
successful completion of the GATT negotiations might very well tend
to strengthen the already considerable dynamism of the Diropean
economies and lead to an increase in their rate of innovation of new
products and new methods of production. Such innovational activity is
a source of unfavorable pressures on the United States balance of pay-
ments because American producers face increasing competition from
newer and lower cost goods at home, in the EEC, and in other markets.
It also tends to increase the attractions of the EEC to American capital.
A discussion of the possible methods of dealing with any resulting bal-
ance of payments difficulties goes well beyond the scope of this
paper. There are, however, basically two alternatives: (I) an in-
creasing dynamism in the American economy so that the United
States can maintain its innovational position; (2) devaluation or rel-
ative deflation, either of which would entail a decline in America's
relative economic position.
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